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Abstract
We analyze the possibility of reduction of systemic risk in financial markets through Pigouvian taxation
of financial institutions which is used to support the rescue fund. We introduce the concept of the cascade
risk with a clear operational definition as a subclass and a network related measure of the systemic risk.
Using financial networks constructed from real Italian money market data and using realistic parameters,
we show that the cascade risk can be substantially reduced by a small rate of taxation and by means of a
simple strategy of the money transfer from the rescue fund to interbanking market subjects. Furthermore,
we show that while negative effects on the return on investment (ROI) are direct and certain, an overall
positive effect on risk adjusted return on investments (ROIRA) is visible. Please note that the taxation
is introduced as a monetary/regulatory, not as a fiscal measure, as the term could suggest. The rescue
fund is implemented in a form of a common reserve fund.
Introduction
Since the onset of the global financial and economic crisis there has been a lot of suggestions on how
to prevent similar future turmoils, how to minimize the contagion likelihood and how to manage the
trade-off between stability and ineficiency of the financial system [1–6]. One of the most severe issues
that regulators and think-tanks encountered to assess the systemic risk was a lack of reliable data [7].
Microeconomic data with lending patterns are particularly scarce and the analyses of the money market
(MM) stability with respect to interconnectedness of the system suffers with the issue to be adequately
tested with real observations. The systemic risk as a consequence of interconnectivity of market subjects
was marked as a clear cause for the wide spread of the crisis [5, 6, 8]. At the peak of the crisis, while
central banks and regulatory bodies struggled to come up with short and long term refinancing facilities
and/or quantitative easing solutions, it was clear that there are no metrics or models on how to manage
negative implications of interconnectivity of market players. Not only was it not clear how to stabilize the
system, but there was not a single available metric how to clearly manage any aspect of interconnectivity
and its consequences.
There has been a substantial rise in systemic risk research, especially since 2008 [8]. Part of an effort
targeted qualitative analysis of potential contagion spreading while others focused on quantifying the
systemic risk of nodes. Relation between systemic risk and networks has drawn more attention [1–6,9–11].
One of the efforts to face the lack of reliable metrics to estimate the systemic risk exposure was the
proposal of the DebtRank algorithm [12], a systemic risk metric designed to measure the impact of default
of some subject on the entire system. This measure was thoroughly investigated by a few central banks
and we decided to use it as a proxy process for evaluation of cascade risk.
Aside DebtRank, during the last few years, other systemic risk measures were constructed as well. The
most popular are Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) [13], Systemic Risk Measure (SRISK) [14], Delta
Conditional Value-at-Risk (DCoVaR) [15], Link-Aware Systemic Estimation of Risks (LASER) [16], and
2PA & GCA measures [17]. Only some of these metrics (DCoVaR, LASER and PA & GCA) are network-
based models. Moreover, most of them do not provide an analytical methodology.
Furthermore, there is a number of papers devoted to the network structure as promoter/inhibitor of
different contagion processes related to the default cascade [18–20]. These more theoretical approaches
point to the very strong dependence of the generic contagion spreading on the details of the network
structure.
The classification of contagion suggested by the World Bank distinguishes between three definitions
(broad, restrictive and very restrictive) of contagion on the basis of the nature of its occurrence. Accord-
ing to the broad definition, contagion is referred to as a “cross-country transmission of shocks or general
cross-country spillover effects”. This definition assumes that contagion can be caused by any type of
linkages between countries (fundamental and non-fundamental). According to the second, more restric-
tive, definition “contagion is a transmission of shocks to other countries beyond any fundamental links or
common shocks”. Contagion in this sense can be caused by “irrational” phenomena (e.g., financial panic,
herd behavior). According to the third, very restrictive, definition, financial contagion does not involve
fundamental linkages either. It assumes that “contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase
during “crisis times” relative to correlations during “tranquil times”. This definition allows a feasible
econometric measurement of contagion. Within the money market, systemic risk can be associated with
different feature of its microstructure: default cascades, freezing of the money flow, herding behavior and
many possible unknown unknowns.
In this paper we focus on the the overall systemic risk that we name cascade risk. We argue that the
cascade risk is a good measure of the systemic risk and clearly define conditions for applicability of our
approach. For this purpose we use the following operational definition of cascade risk:
The cascade risk of the system is the probability that a randomly chosen financial institu-
tion will default due to a contagion propagating through a financial system initiated by the
default of some other institution.
Clearly this definition does not take into account the impact on the real economy and the capital
loss in the whole system, and it does not consider the increase of the individual probability of default.
Nevertheless, it clearifies the process we focus on within the set of all the possible processes that constitute
systemic risk.
We will find out and quantify the potential damage of systemic shocks to a well defined network of
financial institutions. Also, we will discuss critical values of parameters for which one can expect to cover
most of the risk. At the same time, policy implications of our proposal are consistent with the existing
regulatory framework.
Past research proposed several measures for the reduction of systemic risk. One class of them include
rising the capital requirements of market subjects [21–24]. Although increasing the quantity and quality
of bank capital allows to reduce the exposure to some relevant risks, such as credit and market, it could
be highly expensive when introduced in period of crisis. Another weakness of the capital increase is
that banks are expected to pay the cost of capital creating a vicious cycle which concludes into a a
higher financialization level, an unsustainable speculative exposure and, finally, a more probable systemic
risk. The capital requirement for systemic financial institutions, as proposed by the Basel Committe
after the crisis (Basel III framework) could also alter the purpose to guarantee a levelled playing field
among competitors. In this approach every subject should rise enough capital to stop the contagion in
its neighborhood so that the capital is available if contagion starts in the very proximity of any of the
subjects.
Others propose a money market (MM) transactions tax [25–27]. One can tax all transactions or only
transactions which increase systemic risk. We argue that this is not a viable approach because of two
main reasons. First, taxing all transactions needlessly increases the cost of an entire MM segment even
if it is in the process of reducing systemic risk. This approach would discourage MM activity although
3its main purpose is to reduce liquidity fluctuations in the network in a very short period of time, which
is often measured in minutes. Applying a tax on MM transactions would affect reciprocity when trades
compensate monthly, weekly or even daily. Taxing one transaction in a zero netted pair would just
introduce pointless additional costs. Taxing only transactions which contribute to increase of systemic
risk is in a similar category since it does not account for the transaction net effect over a period of time.
For instance, a pair of zero netted transactions would be taxed despite the fact they have no effect on
market stability. This approach would also discourage unconstrained MM activity with effects on market
liquidity which are not discussed. Additionally, identifying transactions which increase systemic risk is an
operational challenge. The implementation of the tax proposal appears to be tricky for the impossibility
to identify in real time trades and allow financial agents to estimate the net fiscal impact on profitability.
The effect would be to freeze the market and, consequently, the liquidity sources could rapidly evaporate.
MM venues would seize to exist in the present form, market-making would be virtually impossible to
implement, and it could all badly end up with the introduction of the quotation matrix.
The questions this paper tries to answer can be addressed as follows: How much a small portion of
balance sheet reserves allocated to the rescue fund increases overall financial stability of the system? Is
there any possible gain for the institutions subject to this regulation that could outweigh the decrease of
market profitability as a consequence of the proposed taxation?
We simulate the effect of Pigouvian taxation and the creation of the rescue fund aimed at reducing the
cascade risk and, consequently, the overall systemic risk. Due to the lack of the real world data, we had
to assume certain simplifications and idealizations to prove the concept. We do not provide quantitative
solutions for the financial system stability. Instead, our purpose is to provide a framework which clearly
demonstrates that the Pigouvian taxation can in principle greatly reduce the cascade and the overall
systemic risks. We focus on the framework which can be readily used to quantify the cascade risk and
effects of Pigouvian taxation and the usage of the rescue fund. We also demonstrate that, in a specific
realistic scenarios, the rescue fund can increase the risk adjusted return on investment (ROIRA). We
show that the rescue fund in our setting:
1. reduces systemic risk for realistic levels of reserve requirement;
2. increases the risk adjusted ROI for individual financial institutions and for the financial market in
general;
3. in certain scenarios can assure the same level of stability for significantly reduced rates of reserve
requirements;
4. produce qualitatively the same results in all the cases of the networks we report here.
In this paper we apply the DebtRank [12] to model the cascade risk, and we use real European e-MID
overnight money market data to calibrate the networks among agents [28–31]. Pigouvian taxation is then
used to finance the rescue fund, which is used in the case of default of single financial players.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data and the additional parameters we use
to originate financial networks. Second, we give an overview of the DebtRank methodology. Third, we
propose the taxing mechanism and the strategy for the application of the rescue fund. Fourth, we explain
the way we compute the systemic risk and ROIRA. Fifth, we discuss our results and implications of the
proposed taxation on market profitability and market stability in general.
Data
The model introduced in this research is based on a simplified financial agents’ network, interconnected
via mutual lending and borrowing activities. To calibrate financial assets and liabilities we use the real
European e-MID overnight money market data. This is the only electronic market for interbank deposits
4in the Euro area and the USA. The data base is composed by the records of all transactions registered
in the period from 1999 to 2009. Based on the body of work done in the field of complex networks we
know that:
1. Real financial networks are very heterogeneous both in node degree and in node strength in all
previously reported cases [28–31].
2. Real financial networks exhibit a strong core-periphery structure [32, 33].
3. Small (< 10, 000 nodes) and dense weighted networks, such as financial networks, are constrained
in configuration space and should be similar to each other [34].
Above mentioned facts support the use of e-MID data, since all previously reported facts suggest that
e-MID is sufficiently representative for a broad class of financial networks. Clearly the difference between
the sizes of, for example, U.S. and European financial systems are large, and although we could expect
that the presented results would be quantitatively very different, we expect that qualitatively they should
be very similar.
For the purpose of the paper we present 4 different networks taken in 4 different periods with respect
to the overall economic conditions. The networks are aggregate of one month of transactions for: April
2000, October 2004, November 2008 and September 2009. We choose these periods to compare 2 periods
before and 2 periods after the great financial crisis.
Unfortunately, the field of complex networks is still missing a good reliable model for creation of
weighted directed networks with strong heterogeneity. Presented research would greatly benefit if such
model would be available. We could generate different realizations of financial networks to create a large
number of idealized realizations. This way we trade off a more detailed understanding of correlations
between results and imposed network parameters for the model of taxation on networks which are as
realistic as possible.
The networks we use are relatively small, ranging in size from N = 112 to N = 177 nodes. Their
out and in degree are presented in figure 1 panels a) and b). Although small, these networks exhibit
substantial heterogeneity in their connection patterns. This is a ubiquitous feature of all investigated
financial networks. In the same figure on the panels c) and d) we present out and in network strength.
Heterogeneity is again obvious in both cases. An example of one network used in simulations is presented
in figure 2.
Methods
Parameters
In order to compute the cascade risk using the DebtRank methodology we impose some assumptions with
respect to bank parameters. First, we define reserve requirements and then we simulate different levels
of their ratios.
Assets and liabilities of subject i consist of five characteristic parts: total balance Bi, assets lent to
interbanking market network subject j Aij , liabilities borrowed Aji from network subject j, regulatory
required balance sheet reserve Ei and regulatory required rescue fund Fi, held in the rescue fund. Pa-
rameters found in e-MID data are interbanking market lending Aij , and interbanking market borrowing
Aji. Total assets lent to other participants of the trading network is S
L
i =
∑
j Aij and the total assets
borrowed from other participants is SBi =
∑
j Aji. We use this two variables as out and in strength of
the weighted network. We simulate balances as follows:
Bi = β ∗max(S
B
i , S
L
i ). (1)
5Parameter β is estimated through the publicly presented data of the money market activity compared
to the total banking assets volume for the European region [35]. The typical value used in the paper is
β = 10 although we experimented with values ranging from β ∈ [4, 20]. To calibrate assets and liabilities
using MM data exposures, we a simple strategy of assigning the same β to all market participants.
Factor β can be interpreted as an average of variable βi = Bi/max(S
B
i , S
L
i ) computed separately for
each institution. As long as the average β is a good representative of typical value of the variable βi, our
estimates are economically and statistically robust.
Reserve requirements Ei are also kept in constant ratio to balance.
Ei = η ∗Bi. (2)
We report many different values of η ∈ [0, 0.05] as reserve requirements vary largely depending on country
and economic region [36]. Reserve requirements are regulatory attempt to force market participants to
always retain some degree of resilience to market shocks and to manage the deposit multiplier for banks. In
the simplified systemic liquidity crunch we assume that if the bank short term obligations become greater
then its reserves - the bank would fail. Realistically reserves can be very different from legally required
minimum. In this case we can again assume that each institution has a reserve fraction ηi = Ei/Bi and
that the distribution of these fractions is well represented by their average value η.
The last parameter designed in our paper is the i reserve fund obligation Fi (for any agent i) affecting
the market stability. We propose that each bank puts an amount
Fi = α ∗ Ei (3)
in the fund, α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we use a simple strategy in which banks participate in the reserve fund
proportionally to their size. Clearly different strategies in the real world are possible - a flat amount
tax, for instance. Other interesting choice would be to use some metric, like DebtRank, to asses banks
importance to the stability of the system and to tax proportionally to that metric. We decided to use
proportional tax as we find it to be the most logical to minimize regulatory inequalities and arbitrage
opportunities.
DebtRank
A previously mentioned level of default Ei is assigned to each node i of the weighted directed network.
This level represents a threshold for the bank default, i.e. if the sum of noncollectable loans passes this
threshold the subject fails. The initial level of distress ψi ∈ [0, 1] is also assigned to each node i. The
level of distress hi(t) with hi(t) ≥ ψi is computed as an amount of losses suffered by the bank i after an
iteration t of the model, divided by its own level of default Ei. The DebtRank starts from the initial set
of nodes whose ψi > 0. Loans are represented with outgoing weighted links and each node i at iteration
t increases a level of distress hj(t) = min {1, hj(t− 1) +Wijhi(t− 1)} to its neighbor j. Here Wij =
Aij
Ej
is a fraction of distress that can pass through the given link. Every link in the simulation can be used
only once and we assign a label l ∈ {0, 1} to it. At time 0 all the links have label l = 0 and after they are
used they get label l = 1 and are discarded from future consideration. The algorithm works in steps and
all links have to be used before the next iteration. The last run is experienced when there are no more
available links that could propagate the stress further. Finishing levels of distress hi give the impact of
the process on financial system.
In our simulations we start with a default of one agent s, i.e. ψs = 1. We do not add additional stress
to other market subjects as this has one to one correspondence with lowering Ei for the same amount
of stress. In realistic setting with additional data it would make sense to simulate additional levels of
shock, if one would be interested in difference between the expected and the real systemic risk. Some
other authors simulate and describe the dynamics of risk propagation process [37] and thus have to take
into account subjects’ correlations via mutual asset classes. We instead use the DebtRank procedure
6to estimate the influence of every node to the others and estimate their systemic importance. In this
procedure subjects are connected only via their mutual financial dependencies. Timescale of the process
is assumed small compared to the timescale in which correlations among asset clases become important.
Additionally at our timescales, correlations can be represented as different initial probabilities of defaults
for each node.
Rescue fund strategy
When the first bak defaults, we simulate cascading effects on other interbanking market counterparts.
The strategy of the rescue fund operation we simulate is the following. First the initial subject i upon
request gets its fund amount Fi to try to prevent its default. We assume that the initial subject always
defaults. The rationale for such a decision is as follows: since every subject can ask for its own share
from rescue fund if it is needed, the reserve level Ei is constant before the default cascade. This means
that the probability the first bank fails does not depend on the size of the rescue fund.
One of the issues for financial regulators is to minimize the moral hazard risk when bankers believe
to be rescued with bail-outs solutions. In our model we introduce the opportunity to manage a default
without a serious contagion, reducing the systemic risk.
When the first subject defaults all of its neighbors (lenders) receive all the money needed to stop
further catastrophic cascading effects up to a value of the complete rescue fund. This is the Pigouvian
idea devised in a way that no participant is subject to moral hazard of risky behavior under the protection
of rescue fund, but all other market participants know that they are protected with respect to risky
behavior of their counter parties. If the fund is not big enough to cover all the loses the money is
distributed proportionally to the sum each subject has requested.
To make this strategy viable it is a priori desirable that:
1. the size of the rescue fund is big enough to cover the loss of financial intermediaries in the market,
particularly network hubs, as a consequence of some subject default;
2. the size of the rescue fund is small enough to be easily and urgently replaced with the fresh liquidity
once the fund has been used;
3. the implemented procedures of the rescue fund enable momentary usage of the fund.
Cascade risk
Here we finally present the cascade risk and the method we use to estimate it. Since we defined it a an
measure of the probability of default, we address the probability of default of subject i in a given time
horizon. We split the probability of default into two components. The first component is exogenous and
it is caused by an external market event pOi ; the second component, independent from the first factor, is
endogenous and it caused by interbanking systemic network related risk pSi :
pi = p
O
i + p
S
i . (4)
Here we operate with a simple assumption that pOi of every bank is small enough that we can expect only
one default in the monitored period for which we estimate systemic risk, i.e. max(pOi ) ∗N ≪ 1. We omit
the ”set intersection” term −pOi p
S
i assuming that it is small compared to the linear approximation. This
assumption does not change qualitative behavior of our taxation analysis but introduces only a slight
quantitative changes. Here N is the number of subjects in the network. For the endogenous probability
of default pSi we can write:
pSi =
∑
j 6=i
Q(i|j)pOj , (5)
7where Q(i|j) is conditional probability that subject i will default given that subject j has defaulted due
to exogenous factors. Notice that if we would accept the possibility of simultaneous events, the real
exogenous probability would be:
pSi =
N−1∑
s≥1
∑
Ω(s)⊂
Ω(N−1)
Q(i|Ω(s))
∏
j∈Ω(s)
pj
∏
j′ /∈Ω(s)
(1− pj′ ) (6)
where s is the number of subjects that simultaneously default, Ω(s) is the set of subjects which default
simultaneously and his size is s, and Q(i|Ω(s)) is the conditional probability that subject i will default if
all subjects in the set Ω(s) default simultaneously. The first sum in (6) runs over all possible s - a number
of subjects which could default simultaneously thus igniting a default cascade. The second sum runs over
all the possible sets which contain the same number of subjects s. Products weight the probability of
occurrence of every given set of initially defaulting subjects under assumption that these events are not
correlated to each others.
We use the definition of the cascade risk pCi , mentioned before and write within the approximation of
only one defaulting subject:
pCi =
∑
j 6=iQ(i|j)p
O
j∑
j 6=i p
O
j
. (7)
The cascade risk of subject i is the conditional probability that the cascade will reach the subject i
not depending on subject j which initiated the cascade. Therefore we weight all the paths by probability
calibrating proportionally to pOj , and we can label every cascade path by its starting node j. An important
property of this measure is that it is invariant to scaling of exogenous probabilities, i.e. if we scale all
the exogenous probabilities for the same amount γpOj → p
′O
j ⇒ p
′C
i = p
C
i . This means that the values of
exogenous probabilities are neutral.
We adopt the DebtRank algorithm for the simulation of default cascade, the conditional probbaility
that the j default will affect the i default Q(i|j) will be coherently computed. Notice that DebtRank
always provides the same solution for the same set of initial conditions, so the Q(i|j) is modelled as a
binomial variable. If we further simplify our assumptions and suppose that exogenous probabilities of
the default are all the same, i.e. that there is no difference among the subjects, the equation (5) reduces
to
pSi = ∆ip
O, (8)
where ∆i is the number of times the subject i has defaulted during the algorithm execution, and p
O is
exogenous probability of default which is the same for all the subjects. In this case overall probability of
default is
pi = (1 +∆i) p
O. (9)
The cascade risk of subject i in this case is:
pCi =
∆i
N − 1
. (10)
The cascade risk of the system we define as the average cascade risk of all subjects:
pC =
∑
i p
C
i
N
=
∑
i∆i
N(N − 1)
. (11)
(11) is the measure that quantifies individual exposure of the institution to risky behavior of other
financial counterparts. Notice that the cascade risk does not explain anything about the number of
subjects that can default or about the level of financial shock the MM will suffer in the case of default
cascade. It should therefore be seen as an individual measure to explain the risk that the financial system
estimates for the individual subject.
8Effect on the return on investment (ROI)
In order to devise a scheme for reduction of systemic risk with realistic chances for implementation it
should minimize the conflicts among all the different stakeholders involved in the equilibrium process. We
believe that a scheme that can greatly reduce cascade risk, and therefore systemic risk could also have a
positive effect on the overall return on investment of financial intermediaries. To reduce and maximally
simplify the model, we investigate the ROI of banks. If the effective risk adjusted return on investment
of the market participant’s assets is significantly increased through the positive effects of the rescue fund
taxation, there could also be positive effects to their debt cost along with the market acceptance of their
securities, with a virtuous circle. To quantify this effect we use the following method.
Every subject records a nominal return of investment of their assets ROINi and a risk-adjusted coun-
terpart ROIRAi .
We classify the ROI in two categories: the ROIN for assets inside the network is ROIint, and the
ROI for assets outside the network is ROIext. We also introduce ROIE which is the return on investment
tied to the balance sheet reserve. In that case the total nominal return on investment is
ROINi =
ROIint
∑
j 6=i Aij +ROI
extDi +ROI
EEi
Bi
, (12)
where Di = Bi −
∑
j 6=i Aij − Ei is a total volume of assets allocated outside the money market.
Risk-adjusted ROI is defined as
ROIRAi = ROI
N
i (1− pi)− pi, (13)
where pi is the bank i investment horizon default probability. This enables us to calculate the effects of
rescue fund on risk-adjusted return on investment ROIRA. Before the fund introduction we can compute
ROIRA as follows:
ROIRAi = ROI
N
i
(
1− pOi − p
S
i
)
− pOi − p
S
i
= ROINi

1− pOi −
∑
j 6=i
Q(i|j)pOj

− pOi −
∑
j 6=i
Q(i|j)pOj . (14)
Using the assumption that exogenous probabilities are all the same, i.e. ∀j : pOj = p
O, we obtain:
ROIRAi = ROI
N
i
(
1− (1 + ∆i)p
O
)
− (1 + ∆i) p
O. (15)
After introducing the fund parametrized through the taxation rate α of the balance sheet reserves,
default probabilities change to pi(α) and systemic probabilities become p
S
i (α). Note that exogenous
default probabilities pOi and p
O do not change as our strategy allows for every subject to withdraw the
money from the fund if needed. Now the risk-adjusted ROI becomes
ROIRAi (α) = ROI
N
i (α) (1− pi(α)) − pi(α). (16)
Nominal ROINi (α) also depends on α because some portion of assets is allocated to the rescue fund. We
model nominal ROI with the rescue fund as:
ROINi (α) =
ROIint
∑
j 6=i Aij +ROI
extDi +ROI
E(1− α)Ei +ROI
FαEi
Bi
. (17)
Typical values of the parameters used in our simulations are ROIint = 0.04, ROIext = 0.07, ROIE =
0.03, ROIF = 0.02 and pO = 0.001. We have thoroughly investigated other values of parameters, with
special focus on the pO, ROIE and ROIF finding the same qualitative picture in all cases. In some
9scenarios we find a declining linear regime in ROIRA for the cases when ROIF > ROIE and α are
relatively big. This is not surprising because for large α the cascade risk p becomes very small and the
leading order correction is then due to a change in ROIN (α) as seen in (17). We present most of the
results using aforementioned parameters as they are considered to be a reasonable estimate of real values
based on the publicly available data on yield of specific asset classes [35, 38]. Note that in this analysis
we assume total loss on the ROI after the default. Clearly, this assumption could be relaxed if needed.
Results
Using the methodology reported in previous sections of this paper we run a number of simulations to
investigate the relationships between systemic risk, risk-adjusted ROI, and the rescue fund. In figure 3
we present the relationship between the level of balance sheet reserve requirements η and the cascade risk
pC . Clearly, as the rate of reserve requirements increases, the cascade risk decreases. Also the cascade
risk is much lower if some taxation rate α is present. The effect of reserve fund is especially strong for
small and most realistic values of η. Different values in different panels are a consequence of different
networks used for each panel.
A more interesting question is how cascade risk changes with respect to taxation rate α. The results
are presented in figure 4. It is obvious that the initial level of reserve requirements η also strongly
influences the outcomes. If there are no reserves, the rescue fund will not be funded regardless of the
value of α and consequently the cascade risk does not depend on α. As reserves increase, the parameter
α plays more important role. The largest ameliorating effect of the rescue fund is found for the reserve
level ranging between 0.001 and 0.01. The reserves to network exposure ratio in our model is correlated
with the product βη, as seen in (1) and (2). Therefore the ratio is most affected by α is roughly between
0.01 and 0.1. We believe that this effect depends on the details of the network and the chosen parameters.
The sharp fall in the cascade risk for the small values of α, points to the fact that the best strategy for
the cascade risk mitigation is to combine both the reserve levels and the rescue fund.
It is also interesting to point out that according to our simulations, the cascade risk pC is lower for
networks which were produced from the data for years 2008 and 2009, compared to networks produced
from the period 2000-2004. It is possible that during the most intense period of 2007-2009 crisis banks
traded with a higher level of systemic risk awareness and produced a more stable network of relationships
themselves.
The DebtRank algorithm is also used to define a per node systemic risk measure called DebtRank. It
signals the impact of the distress of an initial node across the whole network. The DebtRank of the node
i, designated as DRi, equals the fraction of the total economic value that is potentially under distress
after the shock at node i. The average DR is just the expected value of the DebtRank if initially shocked
subject is chosen randomly (more details can be found in [12]). In the figure 5 we present the dependence
of average DebtRank with respect to different levels of reserve requirements. It is not surprising that the
average DebtRank is decreasing with an increase of reserves, but is interesting to note that for a very
modest taxation rate of α = 0.01 the reduction of expected DR can be as high as 20%. Overall the curves
on this figure look very similar to the curves in figure 3.
In figure 6 we present the dependence between the taxation rate α and the DebtRank DR. The
relationship is again similar to relationship between the taxation rate α and cascade risk p presented in
figure 4 and the conclusions are similar. Again, it is clear that the reserve level and taxation rate better
work together to reduce the DebtRank of the system.
Aforementioned results indicate that a combination of the reserves and the taxation rate for rescue
fund can greatly stabilize the system and reduce its systemic risk. As stated before, the proposed taxation
strategy is devised so that it should not reduce the market liquidity, that it should be easy to implement
and that it should not increase moral hazard in the system. In order to corroborate attractiveness of
the proposed taxation scheme, we also compute the risk adjusted return on investments of the market
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In figure 7 we show the dependence between ROIRA and the reserve level η. Interestingly, we find
a function as monotonically increasing despite the effect that η has on a nominal ROI. This feature is a
consequence of chosen parameters because Ei ≪ Bi and the negative influence of the reserve on nominal
ROI is small compared to its nonlinear influence on cascade risk. One could argue that this relation is in
fact true as in reality financial institutions often hold more reserves then minimally required by imposed
reserve requirements. The figure 8 shows that the influence of taxation on ROIRA is not only strong but
also beneficial for banks value.
Finally in figure 9 we present iso-curves for the cascade risk. Iso-curves are obtained in the following
way: First, a base reserve requirements η0 is chosen. Then we compute cascade risk for each increase in
reserve requirements η−η0η0 and find α which would produce the same value of cascade risk, if there was
no increase in reserve requirements (η = η0), but only in the taxation for the rescue fund. It is clear
that for all the chosen parameters, imposing a tax of α = 1% is much better than increasing η for 1%.
This is a final proof that in our model, in order to reduce systemic risk, introducing a rescue fund and
taxing the reserves is more effective than increasing reserve or capital requirements. However, in the real
world, the level of reserves impacts the probability of default pO [39]. This is a feature we did not model
in our approach, but [39] and [40] points to strong negative effects of reserve requirements increase on
the liquidity of the market. Since the rescue fund should not have such adverse effects we conclude that
it is, at least, a viable idea to be tested by the regulators concerned with systemic risk.
Discussion
Our model demonstrates that the cascade risk, as defined in this paper, is greatly reduced by even a
small taxation for saving fund. The parameters used in simulation are artificial and there is a question of
how well the DebtRank maps to the real world event of the default cascade. Nevertheless we made a case
for simple proposed taxation strategy, as it is clearly more efficient in reduction of the cascade risk. Our
research supports the following idea: If regulators aim at minimizing the systemic risk or more narrowly
the cascade risk, the taxation for the fund is better on the performance level. Furthermore, although our
implementation would require some modifications of the balance sheets, we argue that it is the cheapest
of all proposed methods for the following reasons. Firstly, this allows to reduce the asymmetric impact
of capital add-ons required to Global Systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) introduced
within the Basel III framework, which could corrupt the leveling the playing field principle. Secondly, it
could help to design the reform for the super-national reform for safety nets, and the insurance deposit
above all.
We have shown also that a very modest taxation can reduce the cascade risk so much that the risk
adjusted ROI of individual subjects in a money market can greatly increase, thus making their coupons
more profitable and thus possibly making them more responsive to presented idea. We believe that the
Pigouvian nature of our tax and rescue fund would not increase moral hazard of individual subjects thus
not affecting much the individual parameters, such as the individual probability of default.
With the introduction of the Pigouvian tax, the simulated contagion effect due to some bankrupt
agents decreases to become "sustainable". The proposal sizes the rescue fund (i) big enough to cover
the loss of most of the individual institutions in the market as a consequence of some failures; (ii) small
enough to be easily and urgently replaced with the fresh liquidity once the fund has been used. In order
to manage the stability – inefficiency trade off of financial firms, we paid a close attention to banks’
profitability measuread with the return on investment (ROI) as well, because the regulatory measure has
to both be efficient, and influence the market profitability as little as possible. A considerable portion of
moral hazard is reduced by construction as the rescue fund assets do not cover initial troubled subject,
but its counter parties. Accordingly with the profitability constraint, the impact of the reserve fund is
strong with small and realistic values of the taxation rate. In order to minimize and manage the systemic
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risk, based on our analysis the tax could range from 2 to 4bps of banks’ balance. To avoid any additional
moral hazard behaviour, policy makers should better calibrate the tax taking into account all the money
market trades to map more precisely the bank network topology and fixing a time period fixed tax.
In conclusion, the debate on rescue policies which ranges from raising of capital requirements to imple-
mentation of money market taxation on transactions is expected to enhance a fiscal proposal coherently
with the economic theoretical background and the banking role played both in the monetary and credit
markets.
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Figure 1. In this picture x-axis is the order of the node with respect to its value on the
y-axis. The panel a) has out-degree on the y-axis, the panel b) has in-degree on the y-axis, the panel c)
has out-strength on the y-axis and the panel d) has in-strength on the y-axis. The heterogeneity of all
the properties is clear.
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Figure 2. This figure shows a network of e-MID precipitants for April 2000. Thicknesses of
edges A′ij are recalculated from the real weights A
′
ij = log(Aij/(0.25 · Amin)). The core-periphery
structure and weight heterogeneity are easily observed. Size and color of the nodes correspond to out
strength of the node computed with rescaled weights. Palette is color coded so that the blue links
(nodes) have the lowest weight (out strength) while red carry the largest weight (out strength).
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Figure 3. In this figure x-axis represents η and y-axis represents cascade risk pC. Different
panels represent the results for networks obtained from the aggregate of some one month data for four
different years. Fixed taxation rate α is constant for every curve in the plot.
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Figure 4. In this figure on the x-axis represents α and y-axis represents cascade risk pC .
Different panels represent the results for networks obtained from the aggregate of some one month data
for four different years. Balance sheet reserve requirement rate η is constant for every curve in the plot.
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Figure 5. In this figure x-axis represents η and y-axis represents systemic DebtRank DR.
Different panels represent the results for networks obtained from the aggregate of some one month data
for four different years. Fixed taxation rate α is constant for every curve in the plot.
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Figure 6. In this figure x-axis represents α and y-axis represents systemic DebtRank DR.
Different panels represent the results for networks obtained from the aggregate of some one month data
for four different years. Balance sheet reserve requirement rate η is constant for every curve in the plot.
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Figure 7. In this figure x-axis represents η and y-axis represents risk adjusted return on
investment ROIRA. Different panels represent the results for networks obtained from the aggregate of
some one month data for four different years. Fixed taxation rate α is constant for every curve in the
plot.
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Figure 8. In this figure x-axis represents α and y-axis represents the risk adjusted return
on investment ROIRA. Different panels represent the results for networks obtained from the
aggregate of some one month data for four different years. Balance sheet reserve requirement rate η is
constant for every curve in the plot.
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Figure 9. In this figure x-axis represents percentage of change of η and y-axis represents
α. Curves represent the points at which the systemic probability of default takes the same value in the
case (i) when no fund is present, i.e. α = 0 and the system is stabilized through increase of reserve
requirements by ∆η and (ii) when there is no change in reserve requirements, but the stabilization of
the system is implemented through the rescue fund. Three starting levels of reserve requirements are
presented through three different curves. The red fat dashed line represents hypothetical case in which
the influence of reserve requirements increase by percentage x would be exactly the same as if the
proposed taxation was implemented with the same rate x. Different panels represent the results for
networks obtained from the aggregate of some one month data for four different years.
